Underwriter reputation and compensation are both topics that have received considerable attention but the question of whether underwriter fee structures provide adequate incentives for investment banks to build and maintain their reputation remains unresolved. We examine this question for equity underwriting and find that underwriters with higher reputations earn significantly higher underwriting revenues. For example, underwriters with the highest CarterManaster (CM) reputation ranking of 9 receive around $10 million per IPO, on average, whereas underwriters with rankings below 9 receive around $3 million. When we control for differences in characteristics of issues underwritten by banks of different reputations while also accounting for endogenous matching between issuers and underwriters, we find that CM9 underwriters earn a premium of $2.6 ($2.0) million per IPO (SEO). When spreads are measured as a percentage of proceeds, CM9 IPO underwriters receive a reputational premium of 1.79 to 3.21 percentage points from an average IPO spread of 6.71% while a third of the 4.28% spread that CM9 SEO underwriters receive, on average, is attributable to their higher reputation. Overall, our findings show that a significant premium to reputation is evident for different measures of underwriter reputation and model specifications, and provide compelling evidence of statistically and economically significant returns to reputation building in equity underwriting.
Underwriter Compensation and the Returns to Reputation
The collapse of Lehman Brothers and the near-collapse of Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch during the 2008 financial crisis have refocused attention on the importance of investment bank reputation. Investment banks operate in an asymmetric information environment that typifies the classic Akerlof (1970) lemons problem, 1 which makes it more difficult for high quality investment banks to credibly distinguish themselves from low quality investment banks and requires them to expend significant resources in building and maintaining their reputations.
2 However, while a considerable body of finance literature has focused on how firms can benefit by engaging the services of high reputation underwriters, 3 to our knowledge there is no direct evidence on whether high reputation underwriters earn reputational premiums on their underwriting spreads relative to low reputation underwriters that would warrant making significant investments in reputation building. Chen and Ritter (2000) document that in the late 1990's, gross underwriting spreads on the large majority of U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs) raising between $20 million to $80 million were exactly seven percent ("the seven percent solution"), which suggests that high reputation underwriters earn no reputational premia relative to low reputation underwriters. Subsequent studies of underwriter compensation have focused largely on the question raised by the findings of Chen and Ritter (2000) of whether the seven percent solution is the result of underwriter collusion in the IPO market. Hansen (2001) argues 1 See Ritter (2003) for a review.
2 Klein and Leffler (1981) , Shapiro (1982) , and Allen (1984) argue that high quality sellers can differentiate themselves by investing resources in developing a reputation for high quality and then charging a premium for their products. Diamond (1989 Diamond ( , 1991 advances a similar argument for high quality borrowers. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a) develop a model in which underwriter fees are increasing in their reputation. Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) propose that underwriters should be compensated for the monitoring services they provide. To the extent that more reputed underwriters provide more corporate monitoring, they should expect to receive higher compensation. 3 See, for example, Titman and Trueman (1986) , Booth and Smith (1986) , Carter and Manaster (1990) , Megginson and Weiss (1991) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a) , Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) , Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) , Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001) , Logue, Rogalski, Seward, and FosterJohnson (2002) , and Ritter and Welch (2002) .
against collusion, noting that the 7% spread is not abnormally profitable and IPO underwriters compete on other dimensions including reputation. However, Abrahamson, Jenkinson, and Jones (2011) provide evidence in support of implicit collusion, noting that the seven percent solution has become even more prevalent in the U.S. since the study of Chen and Ritter (2000) ; in the 1998-2007 period, 95.4% (77%) of U.S. IPOs between $25 million and $100 million ($100 million and $250 million) had 7% spreads, while European IPO spreads were three percentage points lower on average, not clustered at a single number, and declining.
Viewed from the standpoint of returns to underwriter reputation, all these studies point to
another puzzle -at least on the surface, the seven percent solution provides no premium for highreputation IPO underwriters. Indeed, James (1992) finds that higher reputation underwriters tend to charge lower percentage fees in IPOs, and Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) find a similar negative relation between SEO percentage spreads and underwriter reputation. It is possible that measuring underwriter compensation as a percentage of the size of the offering and then comparing percentage spreads across offerings may not capture other cross-sectional differences in issues that are attributable to differences in underwriter reputation. 4 In this paper, we directly identify underwriter returns attributable to reputation by studying the relation between underwriter reputation and the spreads associated with underwriting equity offerings. We employ three metrics of underwriter returns in equity underwritings derived from Carter (1992) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994b) , Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) , Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2003) , and Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt with the most highly reputed underwriters in the top Megginson-Weiss decile (the "bulge bracket") earning average and median gross dollar spreads that are 8 to 10 times larger than those earned by underwriters in the bottom decile. We document the same pattern when sorting IPOs and SEOs according to the lead underwriter's Carter-Manaster ranking, with underwriters that have the highest Carter-Manaster ranking of 9 earning significantly larger mean and median gross dollar spreads in IPOs and SEOs than their less reputable peers. Similarly, when we examine the total dollar spreads that lead underwriters earn from their IPO clients in public equity and debt offerings over a 10-year period starting at the IPO, we find that in addition to higher average dollar spreads in the IPO, more reputable underwriters earn higher total spreads from follow-on equity and debt offerings. Our univariate tests therefore reveal that reputable underwriters earn substantially larger revenues in IPOs, SEOs, and per IPO client over a 10-year period.
We also examine underwriter revenues in a multivariate context. Prior studies have
shown that issue and firm characteristics, such as issue size and firm risk, significantly affect underwriting costs and the spreads charged in equity offerings (Altinkiliҫ and Hansen, 2000) . For the same issuer and offering, a theory of positive returns to underwriter reputation (e.g., as in Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994a) would predict that a high reputation underwriter should receive a premium for its services relative to a less reputable underwriter, but existing literature has largely failed to provide empirical support for this prediction, especially while accounting for other factors that can explain underwriter compensation. 5 We revisit this question by analyzing spreads in IPOs and SEOs in a multivariate context that controls for factors known to influence underwriter compensation in SEOs and IPOs. Our regression results indicate that, while issue and market characteristics account for a large portion of the differences in dollar spreads between high and low reputation underwriters, all else equal, higher underwriter reputation results in significantly higher compensation in both IPOs and SEOs.
For IPOs (SEOs), our estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the Megginson-Weiss ranking corresponds to an increase in the dollar spread of around $177,000
($250,000), relative to a mean IPO (SEO) spread of $5.22 ($5.55) million (spreads are measured in 2010 dollars). Similarly, a one unit increase in the Carter-Manaster ranking (e.g., a move from a ranking of seven to eight) corresponds to a spread increase of around $59,000 for IPOs and $172,000 for SEOs. When we alternatively use a dummy variable specification of the CarterManaster ranking, equal to one for the highest ranking of 9 and zero otherwise, we find an average spread premium of $332,000 in IPOs and $497,000 in SEOs for underwriters with a
Carter-Manaster ranking of 9 (CM9) relative to underwriters with rankings below 9. Regressions of total IPO client revenues over a 10-year period (starting at the IPO) on underwriter reputation reveal similar findings -high reputation underwriters earn significantly higher total revenues from their IPO clients even after controlling for issue and firm characteristics.
We also reexamine our findings after accounting for non-randomness in the matching between issuers and underwriters. 6 We use a Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation to account for 5 Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) document a positive relation between underwriter reputation and the fee revenues they earn from subsequent underwritings for IPO clients, controlling only for IPO market capitalization, but they do not examine how underwriter reputation is related to their fees for underwriting individual IPOs or SEOs. 6 Carter and Manaster (1990) , Beatty and Welch (1996), and Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) show that higher reputation underwriters tend to match with larger and higher quality firms.
the endogeneity of issuer-underwriter matching and observe an even larger statistically significant effect of reputation on gross spreads in IPOs and in SEOs. Our estimates from the Heckman model indicate that, for underwriting the same IPO, CM9 banks receive approximately $1.4 to $2.6 million more in underwriter spreads than banks with Carter-Manaster rank less than 9 would receive. We note that these estimates are substantially higher than the premium estimates of $0.3 million to $0.5 million from our multivariate regression models. In effect, when estimating the returns to reputation, the Heckman (1979) selection model takes into account the positive assortative matching where high reputation underwriters match with higher quality firms, leading to an additional benefit to the underwriter.
On a percentage basis (dollar spread expressed as a percentage of proceeds), our estimate of the premium that reputable (CM9) underwriters receive in IPOs is approximately 1.79 to 3.21
percentage points, which is economically significant when compared to the average CM9 IPO spread of 6.71%. For SEOs, our findings are similar. CM9 banks receive approximately $2.0 million more in underwriter spreads than banks with Carter-Manaster rank less than 9. On a percentage basis, the premium received by CM9 underwriters is approximately 1.67 percentage points, which again is economically significant relative to the average CM9 SEO spread of 4.28%. We conclude that reputable underwriters earn an economically and statistically significant reputational premium for their services in IPOs and in SEOs even after accounting for the endogenous matching of issuers and underwriters. While the question of whether there is implicit collusion across banks does not fall within the scope of our study, what we do show is that notwithstanding the seven percent solution, there are substantial returns to reputation and significant variation across underwriters in the reputation component of underwriting spreads.
These findings provide valuable new insights into the returns to reputation building in equity underwriting while contributing to the corporate reputation literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we motivate our empirical analysis by briefly reviewing the existing economics and finance literature on returns to reputation including in the context of securities underwriting. Section II discusses our data and methodology. Section III reports the findings from our empirical analysis. Section IV concludes.
I. Background
Highlighted by the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) , the notion that reputation is valuable provides an important underpinning for a large body of the economics and finance literature.
Several authors, including Klein and Leffler (1981) , Shapiro (1982), and Allen (1984) , have advanced theoretical models where higher reputation sellers earn higher reputational rents by investing in and maintaining their reputations. In analyzing the impact of borrower reputation in borrower-lender arrangements, Diamond (1989) finds that borrowers who acquire a high reputation benefit from reduced incentive problems, while Diamond (1991) finds that highly reputed borrowers also benefit from reduced monitoring needs. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a) develop a model in which underwriter fees are increasing in underwriter reputation.
The finance literature has paid considerable attention to the reputation rankings of investment banks that underwrite initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), but extant studies on the effects of reputational differences across underwriters have been motivated almost exclusively from the perspective of how equity-issuing firms benefit by engaging the services of high reputation underwriters. 7 In particular, the literature has focused on examining how underwriter reputation is related to IPO underpricing. 8 However, the link between IPO underpricing and underwriter reputation is tenuous at best. Beatty and Ritter (1986) and 7 See, for example, Titman and Trueman (1986) , Booth and Smith (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990) , Megginson and Weiss (1991) , Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a ), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998 ), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001 , Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (2001), Logue, Rogalski, Seward, and FosterJohnson (2002) , and Ritter and Welch (2002) . The methodologies for ranking underwriters based on their reputation fall into two broad approaches. In the first approach, Carter and Manaster (1990) measure underwriter reputation by their relative placement on "tombstone" announcements of successful securities offerings. In the second approach, Megginson and Weiss (1991) measure underwriter reputation by their market share. 8 See, for example, McDonald and Fisher (1972) , Logue (1973) , Tinic (1988 ), Carter and Manaster (1990 ), and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998 . Dunbar (2000) find that IPO underpricing leads to a loss in market share for the underwriter.
James (1992) finds that higher IPO underpricing reduces the likelihood that the underwriter is employed by the firm in subsequent offerings. Nanda and Yun (1997) find that higher underpricing is associated with a decrease in the lead underwriter's market value. McDonald and Fisher (1972) , Logue (1973) , Tinic (1988 ), Carter and Manaster (1990 ), and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998 find that higher underwriter reputation is associated with less underpricing which, taken together with the aforementioned studies, would seem to suggest positive returns to underwriter reputation. However, Beatty and Welch (1996) and Cooney, Singh, Carter, and Dark (2001) find that IPO underpricing is positively related to underwriter reputation, while Logue et al. (2002) find no relation at all between underwriter reputation and underpricing. The findings of Loughran and Ritter (2004) suggest that the level of IPO underpricing is not a robust proxy for underwriter reputation. Smith (1992) shows that Salomon Brothers experienced a significant loss in underwriting market share following its 1991 bond trading scandal. Similarly, Beatty, Bunsis, and Hand (1998) provide indirect evidence on the value of underwriter reputation by showing that underwriters who are subject to SEC investigations experience large declines of IPO market share, which they attribute to loss of reputational capital. While suggesting a possible cross-sectional relation between underwriter reputation and compensation, these studies do not directly examine this question. In a more general context, Karpoff and Lott (1993) and Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) provide extensive evidence of reputational penalties associated with corporate criminal fraud and accounting violations. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994b) , Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999), and Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) show that more reputable underwriters associate with firms that are more likely to undertake future public offerings. Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) also show that these firms have larger IPO and SEO proceeds, possibly due to the ability of high reputation underwriters to increase the selling price of the offering. Therefore, the seven percent solution notwithstanding, these studies suggest the possibility that more reputable underwriters will earn higher revenues from their clients due to their higher frequency and market value of public offerings.
II. Data and Methodology

A. General Sample
We collect data on securities offerings from the New Issues Database of the Securities Data Company (SDC). We include issues marketed in the United States by U.S. firms during 1980 to 2010. Offerings of closed-end funds, American depositary receipts (ADRs), real estate investment trusts (REITs), unit offerings, and competitive bid offerings are excluded. We also exclude a small number of offerings with missing data on proceeds and/or gross spreads. We use the remaining offerings to compute the market share based reputation measure discussed below.
All proceeds exclude overallotment options, and we express all dollar amounts in January 2010 U.S. dollars using the GDP implicit price deflator. 9 In some of our analyses, we also use data on public straight and convertible debt offerings, which are collected from SDC.
Our first underwriter reputation measure is based on Megginson and Weiss (1991 
B. IPO Sample
For the IPO sample, we select only public offerings of common stock that SDC defines as "Original IPOs," common stock that has never traded publicly in any market and the firm offers it for the first time in the U.S. public market. The issue must be defined as common stock in CRSP (share code of 10, 11, or 12) and must be listed on the CRSP daily files no later than 40 trading days after the IPO date. We also require that the firm has accounting data in Compustat from its first annual report after the IPO. To prevent outliers from influencing our results, we eliminate very small and very large offerings --those with proceeds of less than $5 million or more than $1 
C. SEO Sample
For the SEO sample, we select issues that are defined as common stock in CRSP and undertaken by firms listed in the daily CRSP files during the 50 trading days prior to the offering.
We further require accounting data in Compustat from the most recent fiscal year ending prior to the offering. We exclude very small and very large SEOs -offerings with proceeds less than $5 million or more than $2 billion --to eliminate the influence of outliers. The final SEO sample consists of 9,159 offerings. Panel B of Table I reports descriptive statistics for the SEO sample.
[Insert Table I about here]
D. Underwriter Returns
We use three measures of underwriter returns. Our first measure of underwriter returns is based on Benveniste et al. (2003) and Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) and is equal to the revenue earned by the underwriter per underwritten IPO. Our second measure of underwriter returns, revenue per underwritten SEO, is derived from extending the same idea to SEOs. Our third measure of underwriter returns is the revenue per underwritten firm over a 10-year period starting at the IPO. This measure of underwriter returns combines the findings in Carter (1992), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994b) , Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999), and Fernando, Gatchev and Spindt (2005) .
For a particular security offering, we use the gross spread as a proxy for revenue. For our third measure, we use the sum of the IPO gross spread and gross spreads from the IPO client's SEOs and public straight and convertible debt offerings earned by the IPO lead underwriter during a 10-year period starting on the IPO date. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The underwriters in Table II are listed according to total underwritten proceeds from highest to lowest. Goldman Sachs ranks highest in terms of total proceeds and also has the highest average gross spread in IPOs ($18.7 million) and highest average gross spread in SEOs ($12.9 million). Goldman Sachs also has the [Insert Table II about here]
E. Regression Methodology
E.1. Modeling Spreads in SEOs and IPOs
In our multivariate analyses, we utilize OLS regressions to control for factors other than underwriter reputation that have been shown to influence underwriter spreads in common stock offerings. For spreads in individual SEOs and IPOs, we follow Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000) and model the gross spread as inclusive of a fixed component and a variable component. Formally,
we can express the gross spread of a given offering as:
where Spread is the total dollar compensation paid to the underwriter(s), K is the fixed component of the spread, P is the dollar amount of proceeds, and V spread is the variable cost per dollar of proceeds. This model views underwriters as producers of proceeds with both fixed and variable costs and assumes that spreads reflect these costs. The fixed component, K, covers the underwriters' setup expenses that are independent of the issue size. These may include taxes, expert fees, SEC registration fees, legal and litigation expenses, and bank overhead expenses. It is important to note that the fixed component of the spread is fixed only in the sense that, for a given underwriting syndicate and issuing firm, it does not vary with the size of the offering. For a given firm, the underwriters' remaining variable costs, P×V spread , are expected to be increasing in proceeds, since greater levels of underwriting service are required to market and place larger offerings.
Empirically, Equation (2) can be estimated as follows:
where for offering i, i Z is a vector of determinants that influence the fixed component of the spread and i X is a vector of determinants that influence the variable component of the spread.
Empirically, the coefficient vector  can be estimated by including interactions between proceeds and the variables in i X on the right-hand side of the regression. As in Altinkiliç and
Hansen (2000), as determinants of the variable component of the spread in SEOs, we include the relative size of the offering (offer proceeds scaled by the pre-issue market value of the issuer's common equity), the standard deviation of the issuer's daily stock returns during a 255 trading day period that ends 20 trading days prior to the offering, and total SEO proceeds in the US market during the three months prior to the offering. Greater relative issue size should increase placement costs for underwriters since more certification is needed to offset rising adverse selection costs (Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2000; Hansen, 2001 ).
Return volatility may proxy for information asymmetry between investors and the firm's managers, which raises certification and marketing costs (Booth and Smith, 1986; Denis, 1991; Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2000; Hansen, 2001) . Greater return volatility may also increase the premium on the underwriter's short put option that would necessitate buying the issuer's shares at the offer price and reselling them at the lesser of the offer price and prevailing market price (Bhagat and Frost, 1986; Hansen and Torregrosa, 1992; Altinkiliç and Hansen, 2000; Hansen, 2001) . Total SEO proceeds during the three months prior to the offering serves as a proxy for primary capital market activity, with which underwriters' costs may vary. As argued by Altinkiliç and Hansen (2000), greater financing activity could reflect greater investment opportunities and hence lower adverse selection, which would lower the certification costs of underwriting. Greater levels of financing may also reflect higher investor demand for new issues, which could lower marketing costs due to lower levels of effort required to place the offering. On the other hand,
higher demand for underwriting services may put upward pressure on spreads if the underwriting industry is capacity constrained.
As additional determinants of the variable portion of the spread in SEOs, we also include the firm's return-on-assets (ROA) as a measure of operating performance, a dummy variable for whether the offering is shelf registered, and the proportion of secondary shares offered. ROA is measured with data from Compustat and is defined as operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets from the firm's last annual report before the offering. Firms with better operating performance may require less certification and lower marketing costs (Burch, Nanda, and Warther, 2005) , which would lower the spread. We use SDC to determine which offerings are shelf registered. Several studies have shown that shelf registration has a negative effect on underwriting spreads and the cost of issuing equity (Kidwell, Marr, and Thompson, 1987; Allen, Lamy, and Thompson, 1990; Denis, 1991; Burch, Nanda, and Warther, 2005) . We collect data on the amount of secondary shares in the offering from SDC. Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997) suggest that secondary sales are associated with better timing of IPOs with good earnings prospects. Better timing may lower the spread if it coincides with periods of high investment opportunities, since adverse selection costs may be lower when investment opportunities are high.
In addition, Logue and Lindvall (1974) note that more insiders can raise bargaining power with underwriters, while Dunbar (1995) and Hansen (2001) find that IPO spreads decrease as secondary sales increase.
For IPOs, we use controls that are analogous to those for SEOs, with the exception that we do not control for shelf registration, since a trivial portion of IPOs are shelf registered. We measure relative issue size in IPOs as proceeds scaled by the firm's market value of common equity on the first day that the firm appears in CRSP, up to 40 trading-days after the IPO. We measure the standard deviation of daily returns over a 255 trading day period that starts 41 trading days after the IPO. We measure the firm's ROA with data in Compustat from the firm's first annual report after the IPO.
Regarding the fixed component of the spread, initially we consider a parsimonious specification of Equation (3) The regression models we estimate initially do not allow the variable component of the spread to vary with the underwriter's reputation, which may be unrealistic since pricing technologies and capacity for risk-bearing may vary across underwriters of differing reputations.
We subsequently allow for differences in variable costs across underwriters, by alternatively estimating spread equations separately for reputable underwriters and less reputable underwriters using an approach that also adjusts for the endogeneity of issuer-underwriter matching (discussed below). In these analyses, we follow Fang (2005) and regard underwriters with a Carter-Manaster ranking of 9 as one group and those with a ranking below 9 as another. Estimating the spread equation separately for underwriters with CM rankings of 9 and for underwriters with rankings below 9 has the relative advantage of allowing all parameters in the model to differ for the two groups of underwriters. It has the relative disadvantage that underwriter reputation must be reduced to a discrete binary variable, which will reduce the power of the tests to detect a significant relation between spreads and reputation if the true spectrum of underwriter reputations is not adequately described by two discrete categories.
E.2. Accounting for Endogenous Issuer-Underwriter Matching
A potential drawback of estimating regressions of underwriting spreads on underwriter reputation measures is that the approach assumes a random matching between issuers and underwriters. However, as suggested by existing theoretical and empirical literature, the matching between issuers and underwriters is likely not random. Carter and Manaster (1990) and Beatty and Welch (1996) observe that high quality banks underwrite less risky offerings. Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) present a formal theory that predicts positive assortative matching in primary equity markets, and find that reputable underwriters tend to match with larger firms, less risky firms, and firms that are more likely to survive and issue equity in the future. Fang (2005) documents similar empirical findings in primary debt markets. Thus, reputable underwriters may have an incentive to underwrite high quality issues precisely out of concerns over preserving their reputational capital. From the perspective of issuers, observable factors, such as firm size and risk, and unobservable factors, such as private information known to managers, may influence the firm's decision to seek the services of a reputable underwriter. Likewise, the decision of an underwriter to match with an issuer may be based on observable factors as well as unobservable information known only to the issuer and underwriter. To the extent that these unobservable factors also influence the spread that issuer's must pay to float an issue, the regression estimates of the effect of underwriter reputation on spreads will be biased. As described in Heckman (1979), this problem amounts to an omitted variable bias, since the unobserved factors that drive both issuer-underwriter matching and spreads cannot be explicitly included as right-hand side variables in an OLS regression.
To account for the endogeneity of issuer-underwriter matching, we utilize the two-stage estimation method proposed by Heckman (1979 As discussed above, the second stage spread equation is estimated separately for offerings by reputable banks and less reputable banks, which allows all parameters of the spread equation to differ across reputable and less reputable underwriters. We define reputable banks as those with a Carter-Manaster ranking of 9 and less reputable banks as those with a CarterManaster ranking below 9. Inferences on the effect of underwriter reputation can be drawn from a counterfactual analysis as discussed in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) . For firms that employ reputable banks, the hypothetical spread that the firm would pay if it employed a less reputable bank can be predicted using parameter estimates from the less reputable banks' spread equation. The difference between the spread actually paid and this hypothetical spread provides an estimate of the premium to reputation. Likewise, for firms that employ less reputable banks, the hypothetical spread that the firm would pay if it employed a reputable bank is predicted using parameter estimates from the reputable banks' spread equation and compared to the spread actually paid.
III. Empirical Results
A. Univariate Analyses of Underwriter Reputation and Earned Spreads
In Table III to tenth decile. We also sort the IPO sample according to the lead underwriter's Carter-Manaster rank. Again, moving from the lowest-reputed underwriters (Carter-Manaster rank of 0) to the most reputed underwriters (Carter-Manaster rank of 9) we observe a monotonic increase in mean gross IPO spreads, with the lowest-rank decile having the lowest mean (median) of $0.85 ($0.69) million and the highest-rank decile having the highest mean (median) of $9.99 ($7.03) million.
[Insert Table III Overall, the findings reported in Table III [Insert Figure I about here]
In Table IV , we conduct a univariate examination of the association between underwriter reputation and total spreads earned from IPO clients during a 10-year period starting on the IPO date. This analysis considers spreads earned by the IPO lead underwriter in public security offerings by the IPO firm during a 10-year period starting on the IPO date, which includes the IPO, subsequent SEOs, and subsequent debt offerings. This analysis is restricted to firms that conducted an IPO during 1980-2000. In addition, we consider only IPOs with a single lead underwriter during this period.
[Insert Table IV about In Panel B of Table IV , we sort the sample into ten groups according to the CarterManaster ranking and observe mean total spreads earned from IPO clients over a 10-year period of $0.85 million for underwriters with a Carter-Manaster ranking of zero and $13.24 million for underwriters with a Carter-Manaster ranking of 9. Moreover, the mean total spreads earned from IPO clients over a 10-year period tend to increase with the Carter-Manaster ranking, although not monotonically. The findings reported in Table IV suggest that highly reputed underwriters tend to earn larger total revenues from their IPO clients because they earn higher spreads in IPOs as well as larger spreads in subsequent SEOs and public debt offerings by their IPO clients. The latter result is consistent with the finding of Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) .
B. Multivariate Analyses of SEO and IPO Gross Spreads
B.1. No Correction for Endogenous Issuer-Underwriter Matching
In (2), the coefficient on the Carter-Manaster ranking implies that a one unit increase in the ranking corresponds to a $59,000 increase in the IPO gross spread. Equivalently, relative to underwriters with the lowest CM rank of 0, underwriters with the highest CM rank of 9 receive an additional gross spread of $531,000 (9×0.059 million) per IPO. The results in specification (3) suggest that the returns to reputation are most pronounced for the highest reputation underwriters; the IPO spreads received by underwriters with a Carter-Manaster ranking of 9 are larger by around $332,000 relative to the spreads received by underwriters with rankings below 9.
Examining the coefficient estimates from the models of SEO spreads (specifications (4), (5), and (6)), we find that a one standard deviation (7.55) increase in the Megginson-Weiss ranking corresponds to around $250,000 increase in the gross spread underwriters received from an SEO, on average (specification (1)). When comparing underwriters in the two extreme deciles of MW reputation, we find that, relative to underwriters in the lowest decile, underwriters in the highest reputation decile receive an additional gross spread of $793,650. In specification (2), the coefficient on the Carter-Manaster ranking implies that a one unit increase in the ranking corresponds to a $172,000 increase in the SEO gross spread so that, relative to underwriters with a ranking of 0, underwriters with a ranking of 9 receive an additional $1.548 million per SEO.
Similarly, in specification (3), we find that the SEO spreads received by underwriters with a ranking of 9 are larger by $497,000 relative to the spreads received by underwriters with a ranking below 9.
The findings from the multivariate regression models in this section show that a significant part of the higher spreads received by high reputation underwriters is due to the positive relation between issue size and underwriter reputation. However, even after controlling for issue size and other issue characteristics, we find a statistically and economically significant return to underwriter reputation both from IPOs and from SEO. Furthermore, our findings suggest that, for IPOs, the returns to reputation are especially high for the highest reputation underwriters.
Even though the returns to reputation in SEOs are higher than in IPOs, on average, the returns to reputation appear to be more evenly distributed across underwriter reputation.
B.2. Correcting for Endogenous Issuer-Underwriter Matching
In this section we examine the effect of underwriter reputation on IPO and SEO spreads after accounting for the endogeneity of issuer-underwriter matching. To explicitly model issuerunderwriter matching and to control for the effect of endogenous matching on IPO and SEO spreads, we use the two-step estimation method described in Section II.E.2. Furthermore, we use two different approaches to model issuer-underwriter matching. The first approach uses the actual firm and offer characteristics while the second approach standardizes the firm and offer characteristics by subtracting the annual mean and dividing by the annual standard deviation of each variable. The second approach is motivated by the findings of Fernando, Gatchev, and Spindt (2005) that issuer-underwriter matching is relative and not absolute. Because our findings are qualitatively similar across the two approaches, in the discussion that follows we focus on the estimates from the first approach, using the actual firm and offer characteristics.
Both for IPOs and SEOs, we first estimate the probability that the issue is underwritten by a "reputable" underwriter (Carter-Manaster rank of 9). As independent variables in the IPO sample, we include the natural logarithm of proceeds, a dummy variable of whether the IPO is VC-backed, the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity, the standard deviation of the issuer's stock returns, ROA, and a dummy variable of whether the firm pays a dividend.
The independent variables in the SEO sample also include a dummy variable of whether the SEO is shelf registered, 13 the natural logarithm of one plus the total amount of common stock proceeds The estimates from the two stages of the selection model are reported in Table VI (IPOs) and and percentage spreads that sub-CM9 banks would earn to underwrite these SEOs are $6.14 million and 2.61%, respectively, implying average dollar and percentage reputation premiums of $2.02 million and 1.67 percentage points, respectively. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. For the offerings underwritten by sub-CM9 banks, the average dollar spread actually earned is $3.26 million, which is $1.57 million lower than the hypothetical spread of $4.83 million that CM9 banks would earn when placing these SEOs. On a percentage basis, the hypothetical spread that CM9 banks would earn when underwriting the SEOs of sub-CM9 banks is 5.09 percentage points higher (10.46% hypothetical versus 5.37% actual) than the actual percentage spread earned by sub-CM9 banks.
The estimates from the first two stages of the models, reported in Table VI for IPOs and   Table VII for lower reputation underwriters relative to higher reputation underwriters. These findings could be due to less reputable underwriters having lower risk-bearing capacity and facing higher costs of marketing the issue to investors when publicly observable information indicates that the issue is of lower quality. Reputable underwriters may possess superior information production, certification, and monitoring abilities, which mitigate the above-mentioned problems. We further find that the inverse Mills ratio is significantly negative for high reputation underwriters, for both IPOs and SEOs. The statistical significance of this variable underscores the importance of accounting for endogenous matching among issuers and underwriters. The negative coefficient implies that there are unobservable factors that simultaneously increase the likelihood that an issuer matches with a reputable underwriter and decreases the spread. This is consistent with unobservable aspects of firm quality (e.g., favorable private information) simultaneously influencing the matching of firms and underwriters and the costs of placing the issue.
The findings presented in this section provide strong evidence that, the endogenous matching between issuers and underwriters notwithstanding, reputable underwriters earn significant premium for their services both in IPOs and in SEOs.
B.3. Total Spreads Earned from IPO Clients over a 10-Year Period
In Table IX , we estimate regressions with total spreads earned from IPO clients over a 10-year period that starts on the IPO date as the dependent variable. The dependent variable is the sum of the IPO spread and any spreads from subsequent SEOs and public debt offerings that were underwritten by the IPO lead underwriter during the 10-year period following the IPO.
As independent variables, we include our three measures of underwriter reputation and a set of control variables. Modeling of the dependent variable in this analysis is complicated by the fact that it potentially consists of spreads from multiple offerings of different types. Thus, we do not use the model for individual offerings from Table V . Rather, we utilize a parsimonious set of control variables that consists of various offering and firm characteristics. These include the size of the IPO (proceeds), the market value of the firm at the time of the IPO, the volatility of the issuer's daily stock returns during a 255 day period that starts 41 trading days after the IPO, and the return-on-assets reported by the firm in its first annual report after the IPO. Larger firms are likely to raise larger amounts of proceeds at the IPO stage and in subsequent security offerings, which should correspond to larger underwriting revenues for the underwriter. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on the firm's market value of common equity. Similarly, larger IPOs correspond to larger revenues for the underwriter at the IPO stage and we conjecture that firms that conduct larger IPOs might be more likely to raise larger amounts of follow-on capital. Hence, we expect a positive coefficient on IPO proceeds. The effects of risk (standard deviation of returns) and profitability (ROA) are ambiguous. On one hand, riskier firms and less profitable firms may have lower survival rates and may, therefore, raise lower amounts of follow-on capital.
On the other hand, riskier firms and less profitable firms may be more likely to have greater needs for external capital after the IPO stage due to lower internally generated cash flows.
[Insert Table IX about here] In all regression specifications in Table IX , we find that the proceeds of the IPO and the market value of the issuer at the time of the IPO have positive and statistically significant coefficients. Also in all specifications, the coefficient on the standard deviation of the issuer's daily stock returns is significantly negative (at the 5% level) while the coefficient on the firm's ROA at the time of the IPO is insignificant.
Focusing on our main variable, underwriter reputation, we find that all three reputation measures have positive coefficient that are statistically significant at the 1% level. Specification (2), the coefficient on the Carter-Manaster ranking is positive and significant at the 1% level and implies that each unit increase in the Carter-Manaster ranking corresponds to an increase in total 10-year returns of $296,000. Therefore, relative to underwriters with a CM rank of 0, underwriters with a rank of 9
receive an additional return of $2.664 million per IPO client over a 10-year period. In specification (3) we use the Carter-Manaster dummy variable, which is also positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient estimate indicates that total 10-year spreads earned from the IPO client are larger by around $2.1 million for underwriters with the highest CarterManaster ranking of 9 relative to underwriters with rankings below 9.
In summary, we present results that, relative to lower reputation underwriters, higher reputation underwriters earn significantly higher spreads over the long-run from their IPO clients.
Furthermore, the positive returns to reputation are especially pronounced for underwriters with the highest reputation. The substantial return to reputation earned by the most reputable underwriters should provide underwriters with a strong incentive to maintain their reputation.
IV. Conclusions
We study the returns to reputation in the context of equity underwriting to directly test the question of whether equity underwriters reap benefits from a higher reputation. To assess how underwriter reputation creates value for underwriters, we examine the association between two commonly used measures of underwriter reputation, the Megginson-Weiss market share ranking and the Carter-Manaster tombstone ranking, and three metrics of underwriter performance In multivariate models of spreads in IPOs and SEOs that control for factors other than underwriter reputation, we document significant average premiums earned by reputable underwriters that persist even after accounting for the endogenous matching of issuers and underwriters. While the question of whether there is implicit collusion across banks does not fall within the scope of our study, what we do show is that there are substantial returns to reputation and significant variation across underwriters in the reputation component of underwriting spreads.
Our paper thus adds significant new insights into the returns to reputation building in equity underwriting, providing strong support for the theoretical economics and finance literature on the returns to reputation and filling an important void in the investment banking literature.
APPENDIX I. Variable Definitions
The Spread (%) Spread as a percentage of proceeds.
MW ranking
The Megginson-Weiss ranking of the offering's highest ranked lead underwriter. Rankings are based on each bank's underwritten proceeds for the past three years. See Equation (1) in the paper.
CM ranking
The Carter-Manaster ranking of the offering's highest ranked lead underwriter.
Top CM ranking dummy Equals one if the highest ranked lead underwriter of the offering has a CarterManaster ranking of 9. Equals zero otherwise.
VC dummy Equals one if the IPO is venture capital backed. Equals zero otherwise
Market value
For SEOs; share price times shares outstanding twenty trading days before the offering. For IPOs; share price times shares outstanding on the first day with available CRSP data but at most 40 trading days after the IPO. Measured in millions of 2010 US dollars.
Std. dev. of daily returns
For SEOs (IPOs); standard deviation of percentage daily returns during a 255 trading day period that ends (begins) twenty (forty-one) trading days before (after) the offering.
ROA
For SEOs (IPOs); operating income before depreciation divided by total assets from the firm's last (first) annual report before (after) the offering.
Dividend payer dummy For SEOs (IPOs); equals one if the firm reports a common dividend in its last (first) annual report before (after) the offering. Equals zero otherwise.
Ln(Prior issue frequency) Natural logarithm of one plus the number of common stock offerings by the issuer between 1980 and the day before the offering.
Ln(Prior issue proceeds)
Natural logarithm of one plus the amount (in millions of 2010 US dollars) of proceeds raised by the issuer in common stock offerings between 1980 and the day before the offering.
Secondary
Secondary shares offered divided by total shares offered.
Shelf dummy Equals one if the offering was shelf registered and zero otherwise.
Total IPO proceeds for prior 3 months Total amount of proceeds from all SEOs in SDC during the three months prior to the offering, expressed in hundreds of billions of 2010 US dollars.
Total SEO proceeds for prior 3 months Total amount of proceeds from all SEOs in SDC during the three months prior to the offering, expressed in hundreds of billions of 2010 US dollars. . SDC provides data on issue proceeds, underwriter spreads, secondary shares offered, and shelf registration. In addition, the CRSP daily files provide data on share prices, shares outstanding, and daily returns while the Compustat annual files provide data on total assets, income before depreciation, and common dividends. Megginson-Weiss (MW) rankings are computed as in Megginson and Weiss (1991) . We obtain investment bank Carter-Manaster (CM) rankings from Jay Ritter's website. Proceeds, spreads, and market values are measured in millions of 2010 US dollars. As explanatory variables we include the reputation of the lead underwriter, where reputation is measured by the Megginson-Weiss (MW) ranking, the Carter-Manaster (CM) ranking, or a dummy variable of whether the lead underwriter has the highest CM ranking of 9. As additional explanatory variables we use the proceeds of the offering, proceeds relative to firm market value, the proportion of secondary shares to total shares offered, a dummy of whether the offering was shelf registered (for SEOs only), the standard deviation of daily returns of the offered stock, the firm's return on assets, and the market-wide total IPO or SEO proceeds for the three months prior to the offering. We further interact the proceeds of the offering with the rest of the explanatory variables. Offer proceeds, spreads, and firm market valuations are measured in millions while market-wide total proceeds are measured in hundreds of billions of 2010 US dollars. All models include year fixed effects (coefficients not reported for brevity). The reported t-statistics (in parenthesis) adjust for year and underwriter clustering. *** , **
, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-tailed tests. from probit models explaining whether firms match with an underwriter of the highest Carter-Manaster reputation ranking of 9. We estimate two models, one using the raw explanatory variables while the other using the variables standardized each year by subtracting the annual mean and dividing by the annual standard deviation. Panel B reports coefficient estimates from linear regression models that explain the gross underwriter spread (in millions of 2010 US dollars) while controlling for the selection modeled by Panel A. We estimate the regression model separately for offerings underwritten by the highest reputation underwriters (Carter-Manaster reputation ranking equal to 9) and for offerings underwritten by the remaining underwriters (Carter-Manaster reputation ranking below 9). Panel B further includes the variable "Inverse Mills Ratio", which adjusts for endogenous issuer-underwriter matching and is computed as described in Heckman (1979) using predicted values from the models in Panel A. In addition, Panel B models include year fixed effects (coefficients not reported for brevity). The reported t-statistics (in parenthesis) are computed using the method proposed by Greene (1981) for estimating consistent standard errors when using the Heckman approach. *** , ** , and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels in two-tailed tests. Panel A reports estimates from probit models explaining whether firms match with an underwriter of the highest Carter-Manaster reputation ranking of 9. We estimate two models, one using the original explanatory variables while the other using the variables standardized each year by subtracting the annual mean and dividing by the annual standard deviation. Panel B reports coefficient estimates from linear regression models that explain the gross underwriter spread (in millions of 2010 US dollars) while controlling for the selection modeled by Panel A. We estimate the regression model separately for offerings underwritten by the highest reputation underwriters (CarterManaster reputation ranking equal to 9) and for offerings underwritten by the remaining underwriters (CarterManaster reputation ranking below 9). Panel B further includes the variable "Inverse Mills Ratio", which adjusts for endogenous issuer-underwriter matching and is computed as described in Heckman (1979) using predicted values from the models in Panel A. In addition, Panel B models include year fixed effects (coefficients not reported for brevity). The reported t-statistics (in parenthesis) are computed using the method proposed by Greene (1981) Table VI (Table VII) , which models the IPO (SEO) spread while controlling for the endogenous matching between issuing firms and underwriters. "Actual spread" is the actual gross spread paid by the issuer. For an offering by an underwriter with a CM ranking equal to 9 (below 9), "Hypothetical spread" is the implied spread that the issuer would have paid if it used an underwriter with CM ranking below 9 (equal to 9), predicted using parameter estimates from the second stage equation of underwriters with CM reputation below 9 (equal to 9). For an offering by an underwriter with CM reputation equal to 9 (below 9), the "Implied premium to reputation" is the actual (hypothetical) spread minus the hypothetical (actual) spread. For both IPOs and SEOs, estimates from two different models are presented separately, one in which the first-stage probit uses the original (non-standardized) explanatory variables and another in which the firststage probit uses explanatory variables that are standardized each year by subtracting the annual mean and dividing by the annual standard deviation. The table reports estimates from regressions that examine the relation between underwriter reputation and the 10-year spreads that underwriters earn from their IPO clients. The sample comes from SDC and consists of single-lead IPOs from 1980 to 2000 performed by firms with available data on CRSP and Compustat. The dependent variable is the sum of all gross spreads (in millions of 2010 US dollars) earned by the IPO lead underwriter at the IPO stage as well as all subsequent debt and equity offerings performed by the IPO firm within 10 years of the IPO. As explanatory variables we use the reputation of the lead underwriter at the time of the IPO, where reputation is measured by the Megginson-Weiss (MW) ranking, the Carter-Manaster (CM) ranking, or a dummy variable of whether the lead underwriter has the highest CM ranking of 9. As additional explanatory variables we use IPO proceeds, IPO proceeds relative to firm market value, the proportion of IPO secondary shares to total shares offered, the standard deviation of daily returns of the IPO firm, the IPO firm's return on assets, and the market-wide total IPO proceeds for the three months prior to the offering. We further interact the proceeds of the offering with the rest of the explanatory variables. Proceeds, spreads, and firm market valuations are measured in millions while marketwide total proceeds are measured in hundreds of billions of 2010 US dollars. All models include year fixed effects (coefficients not reported for brevity). The reported t-statistics (in parenthesis) adjust for year and underwriter clustering.
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